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IMPORTANCE OF THE LAND QUESTION:
The land question is an all-embracing term that involves all aspects of land It is a political question rooted in the 
political and historical problem of dispossession The cumulative effect of the problem has had the effect of 
marginalising the dispossessed to the extent that they demand redistribution of land resources by breaking the 
control mechanism of the dispossessor (Surplus People Project 1993).
The land question in South Afnca points to the contradictions of the transition from 
apartheid to a parliamentary democracy.
On the one hand, the South Aincan countryside is characterised by deeply inequitable land 
distribution patterns and authoritarian and exploitative social relations. Here ownership of arable 
land is concentrated in the hands o f an estimated 60,000 mainly White capitalist farmers, whilst 
nearly 70% o f the rural population lives in poverty By the end o f apartheid in 1994,86% of the land 
was and continues to be under white ownership, with 60,000 white farmers holding 86 million 
hectares o f land o f which 10 million is under cultivation.
On the other hand, the policies o f  the A-frican National Congress (ANC)-led government on 
land reform are characterised by a neo-liberal approach that can deliver very little to the rural 
working class and poor. The key pillars o f  government land reforms include a Land Claims Court 
that only considers cases o f dispossession that took place after the 1913 Land Act which reserved 
90% o f all land for White ownership; a land redistribution process which centres on providing 
subsidies for the poor to buy land on the open market; and tenancy reforms which do not in any 
fundamental way challenge patterns o f land oyvnership.
These policies, which are discussed below m some detail, are remarkable in another way. 
Two years before the ANC launched the (jrowth. Employment and Redistribution macro-policy 
(GEAR), a policy based on the standard neo-liberal prescriptions for growth -privatisation, a 
“cheap” currency, reductions in the size and spending of the public sector, deregulation of trade and 
currency movements, labour market flexibility, and the leading role of private investment in driving 
economic growth- the party had already adopted a land reform policy in line with World Bank 
recommendations in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) base document of 
February 1994. .
Ironically, then, the land reform policy was indeed a pioneer- not o f radical transformation, 
but o f South Africa’s home grown Structural Adjustment Policy, GEAR.
Why is it that the question o f land and agrarian transformation came to be shelved for all 
practical purposes, despite the gross injustices of the past, and the vast land hunger of the present?
How is it that rural South Africans ended up with a “reform” policy whose main claim to fame is that 
it foreshadowed the neo-liberal policies of GEAR, applied to the urban working class and poor since 
June 1996?
This paper examines the processes that led to the adoption o f the ANC’s land reform policy, 
and argues that the acute imbalances in power on the land were mirrored in the processes of land 
policy formulation. It argues that policies are not fundamentally determined and shaped by well 
meaning interventions by progressive thinkers, but first and foremost by relations of social power. 
It is in the balance offerees between different classes, both national and international, that the key 
to understanding the outcome o f policy is to be found. It is in the struggles o f the oppressed classes 
that the potential for challenging capitalist and government policy lies.
THE LAND AND AGRARIAN QUESTION
It is important to go back into history and uncover the roots of the present land system in South Africa while 
gaining insight into the luture (Wilson and Ramphele. 1989:191).
Rural land and agrarian reform are among the central most important political issues facing 
a democratic South Afnca. Historically, "[a]ccess to  land, to most other productive inputs, and to 
the many institutions and facilities that enhance the quality o f life has either been denied to blacks 
or has been heavily weighted in favour of whites in the rural areas" (de Klerk, 1992:376).
Throughout the history o f  South Africa conflict over land for access, control and, ultimately, 
ownership has been at the centre o f  the struggles over political and economic power: from the very 
first landing of the Dutch under Jan van Riebeck in 1652, through the rudimentary settlements by 
the burghers released by the Dutch East India Trading company, through the frontier wars o f the 
nineteenth century, and through the rise and consolidation o f apartheid in the twentieth century in 
the age of modem agriculture and urban sprawl, as recently as the 1980s As Colin Bundy (1937) 
notes the central process o f South African history has been how unequal access to land, ratified by 
statute, has underpinned the domination of the majority o f South Africans Between the 1950s and 
the 1980s alone more than 5 million people have been affected by forced removals (National Land 
Committee 1995). The following section will examine the historical background to the land and 
agrarian questions in South Africa. In 1652 the Dutch East India Company established an outpost 
at Table Bay as a staging point for its Asian commerce. The Company subsequently permitted 
permanent settlement at the Cape, hoping in this way to  ensure the provision o f agricultural produce 
for both the passing ships, and for the garrison stationed at Cape Town. From this point onwards, 
there was a steady expansion o f the zone o f colonial power (by the 1860s, the bulk o f the area today 
comprising South Africa had been conquered), and o f  the capitalist economy (once the farming 
methods appropriate the region were discovered, steady agricultural growth took place, although 
this assumed a range o f economic forms before the twentieth-century) (see Ross 1986: 59-60 for 
the latter point). As it is important to note that white society was highly stratified (Ross 1986:66-7,
71) the focus o f the following section will be on the activities o f the landowning class.
The establishment o f an agricultural colonial economy was premised on the generally forcible 
alienation o f the African population from the means of production, principally land (Ross 1986: 72-). 
This was achieved through conquest, which was “piecemeal and drawn out” such that between 1778 
and 1878 there were nine frontier wars, aside from numerous skirmishes between Africans and 
various bands, militia o f incipient colonial authorities, or full fledged military expeditions of the 
British and the Boers against whom the ill-armed African chieftaincies invariably lost.
The dispossession o f the land, water holes, and cattle o f the Khoisan gatherer- hunter and 
pastoralist peoples o f the southern and western Cape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was 
followed in the nineteenth century by steady, violent encroachments on the territories of the more 
powerful Xhosa- speaking agriculturalist communities on the eastern Cape border (Ross 1986: 72- 
4). The first two centuries o f colonial rule were therefore also saw the proletarianistion of the 
African population resident within the effective borders o f the Cape Colony (1986: 76). In this 
manner, the pre-colonial modes of production were supplanted in large areas by large owner- 
operated settler farms, worked by a coerced, harshly exploited, and predominantly Black, labor 
force, the majority o f whom were imported slaves (cf Ross 1986: 58, 76, 87).
In the eighteenth century approximately half o f the non- Khoisan population o f the Cape 
Colony was enslaved, whilst 90% of settler farmers engaged in agriculture owned slaves (Ross 1986: 
76). Away from the south- western Cape, capital accumulation was largely based on the exploitation 
o f Khoisan people, who were forcibly incorporated into the colonial labor process through their 
alienation from the means o f production, and through a battery o f repressive laws and practices 
which effectively tied them in large numbers to  particular farms (Ross 1986: 77-8). The latter 
included legislative measures passed in 1809 and 1812, which introduced a pass system for Khoisan, 
demanded the registration o f contracts, and reestablished the practice of indenturing Khoisan 
children; and the payment o f  Khoisan in stock which could not be moved off the farm.
Between 1828-1838, the British colonial administration removed the legal disabilities o f the 
slaves and Khoisan. Nonetheless, the common experience o f the laborers remained that of coercive 
exploitation, as they were transformed into a proletariat receiving low wages and subject to labor- 
k repressive Masters and Servants Acts passed in 1841 and 1856, and sponsored by their erstwhile 
" masters (1986: 79-87). In addition, in 1828 the British passed an ordinance to allow the Xhosa to 
enter the Cape colony to  seek work after they had been expelled previously from the same lands 
(Davenport 1987, 158).
From the start, the agricultural estates o f the Cape Colony were largely geared towards the 
market (Ross 1986: 56,59-60,64,66). T he production of meat, wheat, wine and other commodities 
was undertaken both for export, and for the internal market provided by the ships that put into Table 
and False Bay, the establishments that grew up to serve them, and the colonial bureaucracy and 
garrison (Ross 1986: 59-60). It is therefore clear that, despite the centrality o f slavery to the labour 
process, the Cape operated as a subordinate component o f a larger, capitalist- dominated social 
formation. The abolition of slavery as an institution at the Cape signifies the transition to full-
fledged capitalist relations o f production.
A very different pattern of agrarian relationships developed in the African reserves, and large 
areas o f Natal, the northern Orange Free State, and the Transvaal Between the 1830s and the 
1880s, various African agricultural societies in the eastern Cape, Natal, and the interior, were 
brought under colonial rule. The Cape and Natal territories were administered by the British, whilst 
the interior was organised into the semi- autonomous, colonially- derived trekker states o f the 
Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal).
However, as Bundy (1972) has shown the process o f colonial expansion, and the land 
expropriations and taxation attendant upon it, did not simply result in the destruction o f African 
agriculture. On the contrary, Bundy has argued that the years 1830 to 1870 saw the emergence o f 
a South African "peasantry" as "hundreds of thousands" o f Africans in the colonised areas 
successfully resisted entry into poorly remunerated wage- labor entering the produce market (Bundy 
1972: 370-1, 375-6). Through technical innovation -household production was adapted to the use 
of new implements such as the plough-, the diversification o f crops, and an expansion o f output, 
sufficient forage, grains, stock and animal products were produced to both satisfy taxation demands, 
as well as secure desirable traders' wares.
The discovery of diamonds at Griqualand- West in 1867 wrenched the Cape and "South 
Africa" out o f the depression of the 1860s, and had a contradictory effect on the peasantry (Bundy 
1972; 376-7). On the one hand, it intensified the demand for African labour on the mines, roads, 
railways, and White commercial farms, a demand reflected in the passage by the Cape Assembly of 
a rash o f new taxes, and pass, vagrancy, and location laws On the other hand, it also made possible 
a "virtual explosion of peasant economic activity" which enabled many to m ed both the new taxes, 
and satisfy growing consumer wants.
The period 1870- 1886 also saw the fragmentation o f the peasantry into strata ranging from 
landless proletarians, peasant migrants, marginally self- sufficient small peasants, better- o ff "middle" 
peasants using family labour, to wealthy capitalist farmers in the true sense (Bundy 1972; 378-9). 
Lewis has suggested that this fragmentation exhibited a great deal o f continuity with pre-colonial 
patterns o f stratification. In the Eastern Cape, at least, only a restricted group o f  African households 
controlled enough productive resources -cattle, land, and family labor- to expand the size o f  their 
total production for the market and maintain or improve their material conditions (Lewis1984; 8). 
This uneven capacity to expand production for the market was partly a residual effect o f  the lineage 
mode of production, in which a small number of wealthy, polygamous elders, owning or controlling 
access to most land and cattle, were able to attach a clientele o f poorer, usually monogamous 
households to their own homesteads, the basic unit o f production (1984: 4-8). These inequalities 
were deepened by massive colonial seizures o f land and cattle (Lewis 1984: 7). Most households, 
lacking the means to expand their total product, were only able to raise the cash needed for taxation, 
purchases from traders, and levies on land and other services by chiefs and headmen, through 
sacrificing part o f their consumption requirements (Lewis 1984: 10-19).
Consequently, peasant stratification was not simply (as Bundy suggest) a feature that
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developed in the 1870s. From the start the impact o f capitalism on the South African peasantry was 
mediated by social class, with some peasants able to accumulate money, purchase land, and generally 
prosper, whilst the majority experienced declining living standards, and extreme vulnerability to 
adverse weather conditions, land deterioration, and stock disease (Lewis 1984: 20-21, 24)
The African peasantry was based in the reserves as well as on mission, government and 
private lands (Bundy 1972; 373-6,379-80). In order to understand how this was possible in colonial 
and colonially- derived States committed to the expropriation of the indigenous people, we need to 
examine the balance of forces existing at the time Firstly, there can be no doubt that the coercive 
power needed to remove Africans from the lands claimed by the settlers was lacking in the Cape 
Colony itself, and even more so in the trekker republics (Bundy 1972: 375,379-80). Bundy remarks 
that while "[i]t was in the republics that the territorial rights o f the tribes had been most brusquely 
ignored [as the] the incoming trekkers announced ownership over virtually all land within the new 
states' boundaries.. the republics' coercive equipment was so lacking, their rule so tenuous, and the 
value o f the land do low for so long, that Africans occupied, tilled, and grazed nominally white lands 
in enormous numbers" (1972: 379). There were, moreover, economic benefits to be derived from 
permitting the development o f  an African "peasantry"; merchants were provided with expanding 
consumer and produce markets; absentee landlords found that renting land to Africans provided an 
easy source o f revenue; whilst white farmers often provided land in exchange for labor- service or 
rent (Bundy 1972: 371-2, 375-6,378, 379-80). Finally, many settlers, officials and missionaries felt 
that the existence o f a peasant stratum was an aid to peaceful rule (Bundy 1972: 371, 373)
The extension of colonial rule throughout "South Africa" in the nineteenth century, then, can 
be interpreted as a phase in the forcible incorporation of pre- colonial modes of production into an 
international social formation dominated by capitalism. However, in marked contrast to the 
experience o f the Cape Colony, where African agriculture was systematically displaced by settler 
estates worked by an unfree labor force, the pre-colonial modes o f production were in many cases 
able to survive by reorienting themselves towards participation in the produce market, that is to say, 
by articulating with the colonial social formation through trade. While the involvement o f the 
indigenous production systems with the colonial economy may initially have had an element of 
discretion their subordination and dependence was to become increasingly pronounced as consumer 
wants, and State tax demands mounted.
On the eve o f the 1886 gold strikes on the Witwatersrand, capitalism was doubly dominant 
in "South African" agriculture; through the establishment of capitalist production relations in most 
settler- ruled areas (Ross 1986: 57); and through the forcible articulation of surviving African 
farming systems with capitalism through commodity production. If, however, the development of 
capitalism before 1886 had been characterised by a contradictory process o f both the destruction and 
the preservation of African agriculture, subsequent decades bore witness to the emergence of an 
increasingly monolithic pattern of rural production relations, as White farming displaced the peasant 
sector to the reserves where it was confined to the role of rural base for South Africa's army of 
migrant labourers.
Several sets o f factors interacted after 1886 to ensure the decline o f the South African 
peasantry. The first set o f factors which contributed to the "underdevelopment" (Bundy 1972: 388) 
o f the peasantry are those which might be termed "structural." Over time, peasants became 
increasingly reliant on the purchase o f such goods as agricultural implements, clothes, blankets, 
metal ware and new foodstuffs for their subsistence (Bundy 1972: 387). This shift from 
"discretionary" to "necessary" spending was the result o f psychological factors such as habit and 
reliance, state insistence on the purchase o f goods such as European clothes, the emergence of new 
needs such as schooling, as well as the decline o f handicrafts in the face o f  competition from 
manufactured goods. However, peasants at the also suffered from a "contractual inferiority" in their 
interactions with the traders, in whose hands were concentrated not just the functions of purchasing 
peasant produce, but also those o f supplying manufactured goods and credit (Bundy 1972 387). 
Bundy describes the ensuing situation thus: "[tjrader and peasant enacted in microcosm the adverse 
terms of trade of a colonial relationship" (ibid.) Meanwhile, growing pressures on the peasantry 
forced many to enter migrant labour, which reduced levels o f economic activity in the reserves, 
thereby reproducing the need for more migrant labour (Bundy 1972: 387-8).
Other discriminatory measures arising from the inferior position o f African peasants in the 
colonial order also exercised negative effects on their future prospects. Foremost among these was 
the shortage of land available to the peasantry, arising initially from the sweeping land expropriations 
o f the nineteenth century, and exacerbated by the increasing restrictions on peasant tenures on 
White- owned lands that took place in the twentieth century (Bundy 1972: 386-7, see below for 
more on the latter point). There was, moreover, an "almost total dearth" o f public or private 
investment in the peasant sector, whether in the form o f infrastructural provision or o f social 
spending on health, wel&re and education. As W.M. Macmillan put it more than sixty years ago, "to 
locate the native reserves, it is no bad rule ... to look for the areas circumvented or entirely missed 
by even branch railway lines" (quoted in Bundy 1972: 3 87) The cost o f wagon- borne produce made 
competition prohibitive, and many peasants underproduced for lack of market access. Adding to the 
challenges facing the peasantry was the rinderpest epidemic o f  1896-7, which killed off African cattle 
in numbers exceeding 80% in some districts, and the drought o f that same decade (Bundy 1972: 
381).
In addition to such structural disabilities, a number of direct "political" interventions were 
undertaken by an increasingly powerful colonial State power to undermine the independence of the 
peasantry (Bundy 1972: 371-2). Bundy notes that the discovery of gold in 1886, like that o f 
diamonds two decades earlier, affected the peasantry in a contradictory manner (Bundy 1972: 381). 
As massive new urban markets emerged in the interior "opportunities for gain were again seized by 
some peasants, and notable advances recorded."
At the same time "pressure on the peasantry . . increased on a number of fronts". Firstly, the 
new gold- mining industry required large amounts o f cheap wage- labor to exploit the massive seams 
of low- grade ore that stretched for miles beneath the Witwatersrand Secondly, the mines required 
large amounts o f cheap food, a demand which not only had the effect o f increasing the value of
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White- owned lands, but o f  decisively precipitating the wealthier White fanners into commercial 
production. However, the plans of both the mine- owners and the aspirant White capitalist farmers 
were fiostrated by the labor bottleneck presented by the existence o f an independent African 
peasantry (Bundy 1972; 383). In addition, commerciali^g White fiumers found that sections o f the 
peasantry presented an effective though unwelcome competition in produce as weU as land markets: 
besides leasing at least 1,300 farms, Transvaal Africans bought over a quarter million acres o f land 
(Bundy 1972: 382-3).
Neither Randlords nor the wealthy landlords were, however, lacking in political influence, 
and the decade following the Anglo- Boer War (1899-1902) saw a sustained State oflFensive against 
the peasantry in all areas o f the future "South Africa" A battery o f laws were promulgated, including 
the Natives Tax Act (1908) in the Transvaal, the Identification ofNatives Servants Act (1901), 
Masters and Servants Amendment Act (1901), Squatters Rent Amendment Act (1901), and the poll 
tax on all male adults (1905) in Natal, and increasingly rigorously enforced Location Acts (1892, 
1899, 1909) in the Cape (Bundy 1972: 384-6). These measures were generally complemented by 
rent increases, evictions, and attempts to impose labor tenancy by the White fruoiers (ibid.).
I f  these earlier measures had been "sniping", then the "heavy artillery" was provided by the 
1913 Natives Lands Act (Bundy 1972: 384). The Land Act had two main thrusts: firstly, it sought 
to  satisfy the labor demands o f the mines and White farms, and to  halt peasant competition with 
White farmers, by banning tenure arrangements on White- owned land other than labour- tenancy; 
and, secondly, it acted to halt African competition in the land market by restricting African purchases 
to  the reserve areas, then comprising approximately 11 % o f the sur&ce o f  the country (Bundy 1972: 
384-5).
However, having considered the various legislative enactments passed in this period against 
the peasantry, it is important not to  assume that such measures were necessarily effectively or rapidly 
translated into actual changes in social relationships. The actual impact o f  a given Act reflected the 
ability o f the State apparatus to  enforce it in given conditions, as weD as the mediating effect o f the 
particular patterns o f  class relationships present in particular areas. Keegan's (1983) study o f 
sharecropping relationships on the maize belt o f the southern highvdd in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries serves not only to illustrate these points but to highlight the complex and often 
^contradictory process whereby settler fanning came to supplant African agriculture.
'  According to Keegan sharecropping -a system in which surplus labor is expended on the
tenant's plot, and the surplus extracted by landlord in the form o f a proportion o f the crop (Keegan 
1983: 195)- spread rapidly in the 1890s in response to the emergence o f  markets at Kimberly and 
the Rand, and was the dominant relation o f production in arable areas in the decade following the 
Anglo- Boer War (Keegan 1983: 196). Sharecropping offered a way for African peasants to retain 
their independence. It was also the only way that poorer White landlords who lacked the capital and 
labor needed to make the transition to fully capitalist relations o f  production could continue to 
operate in a context o f unprecedented levels o f commodity production (Keegan 1983: 196-200). 
However, the inability or unwillingness o f sharecroppers' to reinvest in improved technology set
definite limits on their ability to increase their output beyond a certain level made them vulnerable 
to expropriation as land prices rose and the opportunity cost o f sharecropping increased for 
capitalizing landlords (Keegan 1983; 201). The sharecroppers were thus especially vulnerable to a 
general flow of capital into the landlord economy such as the one that took place in the half decade 
after 1907, with the ending of the post- war depression, the availability o f private finance to maize 
farmers on an unprecedented scale, and the intervention o f the state in the promotion o f  settler 
agriculture through such means as the provision o f agricultural loans and the subsidization o f fi-eight 
rates (ibid ).
These conditions allowed an increasing number o f landlords to make the transition to 
capitalist farming, and this was reflected in an increasingly loud clamour for state intervention against 
sharecropping arrangements which "tied up" labor supplies (Keegan 1983: 201-3). Certainly the 
claims of the "progressive" farmers contributed to the passage o f the Natives Land Act in 1913, 
which Keegan characterizes as the "most important legislative intervention in process o f agrarian 
class formation in these years" (1983: 203). Keegan, however, takes pains to dispute the 
conventional emphasis placed on the Act's banning of rents paid in cash or shares, pointing out that 
these provisions were rarely enforced and easily evaded, and that this was in turn the unavoidable 
consequence of a situation in which the majority o f farmers continued to depend on the enterprise 
o f the African peasantry (1983: 203-5).
The real significance of the Act was that it "allowed some landlords increasingly to limit 
peasant independence and to impose ever stricter labor conditions on tenants": by insisting on labor- 
tenancy, and by making provision, moreover, that Afiican tenants (in the Orange Free State) be 
defined as servants under the Masters and Servants Act, it reduced the defence o f peasantry, and 
increased the coercive apparatus at the disposal o f the landlord (Keegan 1983: 204-7). The 1913 
Land Act was meant to eradicate independent black tenant farmers so that the only legal rent 
payment by black tenants to white landlords was the provision o f labour service (Keegan, 1989).
In 1923, a principle o f separate residential areas in urban locations was established, and this 
principle was extended by the (jroup Areas Act o f 1950. In an attempt to deal with problems of 
forcing people to live on small areas o f  land, betterment planning was introduced. This included 
cattle-culling, fencing off fields and grazing land from residential areas and the moving o f people into 
villages set away from farming areas In 1963, the Native Development Trust and Land Act was 
passed which allocated already promised land to the reserves. Squatting was also made illegal. The 
1936 Land Act was passed in order to promote segregationist ideals It set up the South Afiican 
Native Trust to consolidate Afiican areas and created structures and laws designed to strip Africans 
of their access to land in "white" farming areas. Even Afiicans with titles to  land were subject to 
removal.
In 1937, the Native Laws Amendment Act was also enacted to prohibit Africans from buying 
land from non-Africans in urban areas. Further more the Group Areas Act was promulgated in 1950. 
This Act racially segregated areas with respect to residence and business and controlled inter-racial 
property transfers. In a further attempt to ensure separate and unequal development, the Bantu
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Authoiities Act was passed in 1951 This Act allowed the establishment o f tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities Also, to ensure complete illegality o f squatting, the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act was passed in 1951. This Act allowed the government to establish resettlement camps 
for surplus people evicted from white farms The Natives Resettlement Act was passed in 1954 to 
give the state the authority to remove Africans from any area in the magisterial district of 
Johannesburg and adjacent areas (Human Awareness Programme 1989).
The Land Acts and other related land laws, settlement planning, forced removals and the 
Bantustan system, contributed to  overcrowding in the former homelands and black townships 
between 1960 and 1980 (Human Awareness Programme 1989). These intensifying pressures led to 
mounting rural resistance and a series o f rural revolts in the 1950s and early 1960s. Political 
movements played a larger role in these struggles than has been recognised, but often failed to put 
rural issues and organisation at the centre o f their concerns (see below).
In the twentieth century, land dispossession has served a dual purpose: creating a proletariat 
to work in mines and manufacturing, and entrenching the rural domination of White capitalist 
fanners. The flip side o f the concentration o f arable land in the hands o f White capitalist farmers is 
the creation o f an impoverished rural working class, labouring on the farms as low-wage workers 
or labour tenants, or confined to rural slums in the former “homelands”.
Rural relations o f production have been characterised by substantial levels o f extra- economic 
coercion: control over land, and laws proscribing labour organisation have laid the basis for the 
"systematic super- exploitation" ofBlack labour on White- owned farms (Marcus 1991; 36-7), whilst 
chiefs and other state officials have been able to use their control over land allocation in the 
"homelands" to extract labour and compliance from the rural poor (see Levin and Weiner 1993: 32- 
3,40,43) Within the “homelands”, too, women have experienced differential and unfavourable 
placement in relation to  land and other means o f  production (Marcus 1991: 25-7, National Land 
Committee 1995). Land use in South Africa has been ecologically unsustainable, due to both 
chemical intensive mono-copping in commercial farming areas, and legislation confining black 
farmers to that 13% of South Africa’s land surface making up the “homelands” (Cooper 1991: 176, 
184-5).
(jiven this brief historical analysis, to what extent does the current land reform policy 
articulate a historical justification to the urgency o f  having a comprehensive land reform programme, 
able to generate far reaching agrarian transformation in rural South Africa?
A LAND REFORM POLICY IN NAME ONLY
The present land reform policy, as articulated in the RDP Base Document (1994), in the 
Land Affairs Department Green Paper on Land Reform (1996), and in the various legislative 
enactments by the new government, has three main components;
• The restitution o f land rights
• The land redistribution programme
• Steps towards the reform of land tenure
None of these policy measures seem likely to challenge the rural social and property 
structures. The first pillar- the restitution o f land rights, embodied in the Restitution o f  Land Rights 
Act- makes provision for a Land Claims Court to consider claims for land expropriated after 1913 
through racist laws or illegal means. Assisted by Land Claims Court, the Court may decide to return 
land (or provide alternative land) if a claim is recognised.
However, several pitfalls are clear. The first is that claims may only be lodged for period after 
the 1913 Land Act, thus effectively denying the validity o f  most claims. Although the first 
segregationist Land Act was introduced in 1913, it is clearly an arbitrary date from which to 
determine justice in restitution. Land conquest and official forms o f segregation were already well 
entrenched prior to 1913. Secondly, the State undertakes to compensate current owners when 
successful claims are made. Not only is the justice of such payment questionable, but the tight fiscal 
discipline aspired to by GEAR makes it likely that the government will be less than enthusiastic 
about granting most claims. Poor funding makes it difficult for the Commission to (unction properly, 
whilst it is also unlikely that most claimants will be able to provide court evidence. Lastly the 
judicious processes involved in the restitution process plunges the claimants into a potential maze 
of bureaucratic manoeuvre, and is an impractical solution which is likely to create frustration and 
disillusionment on the part o f the claimants.
The government sees the second pillar -  land redistribution- as more important. At the heart 
of land “redistribution” is the notion that land must be transferred from “willing sellers” to “wiiling 
buyers” through the market mechanism. To aid the transfer o f land, government is making subsidies 
of R15, 000 available to households for land purchases. Leaving aside the justice o f  commercial 
payments for land acquired through firm, and discriminatory. State action, the current costs o f 
commercial land (often in the millions of rands) make the subsidy system unlikely to result in any 
fundamental redistribution o f land. It seems certain that the process o f implementing land reforms 
will be strongly shaped by financial considerations. The costs which could accrue to a State which 
would seek to subsidise the purchase of land by the rural poor and small farmers, to pay
compensation for expropriated land, and possibly even compensation to the present owners of land 
restored through the Land Claims Court (de Klerk 1992; 395-6), can be expected to be considerable 
(see, for example, de Klerk 1992; 397,399-400). Clearly any attempt at land reform will be seriously 
hampered by the limited resources at the disposal o f a democratic State (c f Levin and Weiner 1993;
31), especially one committed to fiscal discipline, as is the case with the GEAR programme. The 
redistribution strategy equally ignores traditional structures o f leadership and kinship through which 
legitimacy for land acquisitions may derive. This in many instances has proven to be an obstacle as 
will be analysed later in the paper (The Emjidini Redistribution Project).
Comparative experiences, such as that o f independent Zimbabwe, indicate moreover, that 
the beneficiaries of such schemes tend to be wealthier rural people- not the working class and poor, 
and that subsidies tend to go towards wealthier households. Zimbabwean experience also indicates 
that most land acquired through the market tends to be lower grade land that is unattractive to big 
farmers regions (Levin and Weiner 1993; 38-9)
The third pillar is the reform of land tenure, embodied in legislation of the same name This 
legislation is intended to provide more security of tenure to poor rural people. There is little evidence 
that the Act has halted evictions, rather the effect has been to regulate procedures for evictions. Like 
the other pillars o f land reform, it is silent on the transformation of agrarian social relationships.
Overall, then, the land reform policy seems set to provide, at worst, for a continuation of 
inequitable land and agrarian relations, at best these policies will enable the growth of as Black 
capitalist farming class. In neither case vrill the rural working class and poor reap any meaningful 
benefits.
CONSULTATION OR IMPOSITION?
The government has sought to legitimise the land reform policy as a product o f broad 
consultation with all affected parties. Thus, the Green Paper on Land Reform (1996; 25) claims to 
have been preceded by intense debate involving various interest groups;
In formulating its land reform policy, government has endeavoured to take into account of 
the widely conflicting demands of the various stakeholders and the implication of any specific 
course of action on the land market and investment in South Africa. There are those who 
demand that land should be taken from those who have too much of it and distribute free to 
landless They favour a drastic, state intervention to redistribute land There are others who 
insist that land should be allocated only to those who can prove that they can use it 
productively, and that in any case, that private land is sacrosanct and land should only be 
transferred on the basis of willing buyer and willing seller. The challenge is to find a way of 
redistributing land to the needy, and at the same time maintaining public confidence in the 
land market.
Thus, the land reform policy is presented as one that takes into accounts the demands of all.
harmonising them as well as possible.
However, the sharp contrast between the actual pillars o f the land reform policy, and the 
demands put forward by organisations aligned to the rural working class must be noted. The 
Community Land Conference o f February 1994, convened by the National Land Committee (NLC), 
a coalition of nine non-governmental organisations, culminated in a “Rural Peoples Charter” for land 
reform drawn up by delegates from over 350 rural communities. This “Charter” called for the 
removal o f private property clauses from the Interim Constitution, strong State intervention in land 
reform, to the cut off for restitution claims to be moved back from 1913 to 1652, and for the 
expropriation without compensation of White farmers who benefited from apartheid (AFRA News 
January and February 1994). Yet although the conference’s report was presented to various political 
parties, including the ANC, none o f these demands have been reflected in any o f the main policy 
documents and measures.
The total absence of the demands of the rural working class and poor from the land reform 
policies suggests that the rhetoric o f “consultation” was no more than a rubber stamp to legitimise 
policies already decided elsewhere. It was not a process o f real participation at all.
This shows up the fallacy o f seeing government policy as the product o f  open and democratic 
discussion. Rather, policy making should be understood as an interactive process shaped by unequal 
power relations (Walt 1994) In such a situation, the participation o f  ordinary people is reduced to 
“soft” participation -  in which “experts” collect data from informants- rather than not “hard” 
involvement in actual decision-making (Cock n.d ).
It is our argument that such a situation inevitably characterises all policy making in situations 
of inequality Power is not diffused amongst all participants as the liberal pluralist model contends- 
rather, it is concentrated in the hands of small elite groups. Consequently, governments tend to adopt 
only policies which are compatible with the interests o f the wealthy and powerful (Walt 1994).
Concretely, this means that class power -  refracted in the South African case through the 
lens of a capitalist system based historically on relations o f colonial domination, which may be 
termed “racial capitalism” -  is a prime determinant o f policy formation under capitalism. 
Consequently, it is necessary to  examine the balance o f power between different classes; their 
relative strength at a given period in time.
LAND REFORM IN A NEO-LIBERAL WORLD
The assumption o f an independent, and democratic, nation-state with the power to develop 
and implement independent policies is unsustainable. In part, this is because the notion o f a 
democratic capitalist State accountable to the populace at large is itself a problematic notion. As 
Bakunin argued, “whilst human society remains divided into different classes because o f the 
hereditary inequality of occupations, wealth, education and privileges, there will always be minority 
government and the inevitable exploitation o f the majority by that minority”. Hence, the “State is
nothing but this domination systematised and regularised” (Bakunin 1990: 67)
More importantly, capitalism is an international system of economics and politics, which 
operates to condition the policies o f nation-states in a real way- both ideologically and institutionally 
Organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), large international corporations, the United Nations and other quasi-state 
structures, and international interest groups are all key players that exert an influence on policy 
processes (Walt 1994).
International forces have undeniably played an important role in shaping land reform policy 
in South Africa The collapse of the centrally planned economies of East- central Europe and the 
Soviet Union, and the subsequent end of the Cold War have demoralised the left Without accepting 
that these countries were in way socialist, their identification with socialism in the minds of many 
activists has, as Lehulere (1996) has pointed out in this journal, helped demoralise a whole layer of 
activists The collapse o f the East bloc was matched by the crisis o f social democratic welfarism in 
the West (see Teeple 1995), and the failureof State-driven “developmentalism” in most of the Third 
World
Underlying these crises has been the growing internationalisation o f capitalist corporations 
in the context o f an international crisis o f overaccumulation that began in the early 1970s 
International economic restructuring in the context o f the crisis has been directed at both reducing 
wage levels (monetary wages and social wages), and securing new areas for investment Hence, the 
neo-liberal policy agenda has focussed on the rollback o f  the State from social programmes, 
including social welfare, social services, and the regulation o f the prices o f basic commodities, a 
reorganisation o f the tax structure (with an overall shift in revenue sourcing from corporate to 
private taxpayers, and a less progressive tax structure), the promotion of flexible labour markets, 
and the privatisation and deregulation of those areas o f the economy in which the State hitherto 
intervened (Teeple 1995). The effect has been to open new areas for investment, allow the pressures 
o f the emerging international labour market to drive down wages, cut the social wage (both by 
restricting government spending and reducing government revenue), and undermine legislative 
protection for working people. In the neo-liberal agenda, it is the market that allocates benefits and 
rewards, through voluntary transactions- not the State.
Equally central to the neo-liberal agenda has been the promotion o f private property rights 
(Teeple 1995). In a situation o f unequal property ownership, this amounts to the perpetuation of 
existing power relations- the free market is not “free” but a site o f inequality: it is these rights which 
both signify unequal class power and underpin the accumulation process under capitalism Neo­
liberal policies have been promoted both by international institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation
THE WORLD BANK AND THE RURAL RESTRUCTURING POLICY:
Such an international context is hardly conducive to policies o f radical land and agrarian 
reform. Indeed, international pressures for neo-liberal policy adoption have played a central part in 
shaping South Africa’s flawed land reform programme.
The World Bank was a key player in the formulation of the ANC’s land reform policy. The 
Bank's involvement in South African land policies began February 1992 when its first agricultural 
mission -  a team of local and international experts- was sent to gather information on the agricultural 
sector (Levin and Weiner 1994: 304-310). This mission was followed by a workshop in Swaziland, 
organised in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Noting the 
need to undertake some form of land reform in South Africa, the conference discussed international 
experiences in this area.
The conference also agreed on the need to organise a follow up workshop to examine land 
reform options. The World Bank undertook the research, using international funding During the 
period of this research, the World Bank World Bank agricultural mission developed a close working 
relationship with the ANC- aligned Land and Agricultural Policy centre (LAPC) (Levin and Weiner 
1994). The LAPC was an independent policy unit, which received funding from the European 
Community (EC) and the Ford Foundation.
It is possible that this reliance on external funding may have impacted on the LAPC's policies. 
In 1993, the LAPC hosted a conference on land redistribution options at which the World Bank’s 
proposed policy, called the Rural Restructuring Programme (RRP), was presented (see Levin and 
Weiner 1994; Ludman 1993; Munnik 1993-4). That the RRP proposals formed the basis for the 
RDP Base Document’s land policy is clear from a brief textual analysis.
The RRP advocated two main pillars o f land reform: "redistribution" and "restitution". The 
“redistribution” pillar involved the “use [of] land already on sale and land acquired by corrupt means 
from the apartheid state or mortgaged to state and parastatal bodies” for redistribution to the poor. 
“Where applicable it will expropriate land and pay compensation as the constitution stipulates" 
(Levin and Weiner 1994).
Compare this to the RDP’s own “redistribution” pillar. Significantly, the RDP argues that 
government must aim to redistribute 30% of agricultural land within first five years (ibid.) This 
proposal is a further indication o f the World Bank's influence on the RDP, because the figure of 30% 
of land appears to have been derived from the World Bank's estimate that about 6% o f White- 
owned farmland will come onto the market annually over this period Again, both the World Bank's 
RRP and the RDP call for a process o f land "restitution" in which the sufferings o f people 
dispossessed of land through forced removals and racist laws since 1913 will be addressed by a Land 
Claims Court that will operate for a limited period (Levin and Weiner 1994).
Rural participants at the LAPC conference were highly critical o f the RRP, a reaction
consistent with other research which shows that rural working class and poor people 
overwhelmingly opposed the idea that they should buy back the land which they regard as stolen by 
White fanners (see, inter alia. Levin and Weiner (eds ),1994, Community Perspectives on Land and 
Agrarian Reform in South Africa) Nonetheless, this perspective simply did not appear in the land 
reform programme o f  the RDP, or the post-1994 Green and White Papers on land reform, the talk 
o f participation and consultation “on the ground” notwithstanding
This development underlines the fact that the RRP (and later the RDP section and reform) 
was produced through an “elitist technicist policy process” (Walt 1994): rural working class and 
poor people were sidelined in favour o f a bevy of local and foreign consultants who developed the 
proposals through a short term desk study
NO ALTERNATIVE?
Yet this begs the question why was the RRP incorporated into the RDP despite grassroots 
opposition‘s Why did the ANC so readily and rapidly accepted the World Bank's land redistribution 
policy? After all, the ANC adopted these polices more-or- less uncritically despite the World Bank's 
highly controversial reputation elsewhere in Africa. Moreover, it adopted World Bank proposals 
even before taking offtce, and in the absence of even the threat o f a Structural Adjustment 
Programme, the usual impetus for neo- liberal policies in Africa. In other words, the neo-liberal land 
reform policy was “home-grown”, and voluntarily adopted
Part o f the reason for the ANC's adoption o f the World Bank pi oposals would seem to lie 
in the policy paralysis o f  the South African left which followed the collapse o f so- called "existing 
socialism" (Levin and Weiner 1993: 33) This has been noted by a number of writers who have 
argued that the left has singularly failed to present any sort o f coherent alternative development 
strategy to those promulgated by the IMF and the World Bank (see Makgetla 1993: 8 for a stress 
on the need to develop such an alternative). For Vaughn, the left has failed to articulate positions 
at the level o f concrete "economic realities" and policy formation (1990: 96-7). For Levin and 
Weiner, the paralysis o f  the left has led progressive South African policy- makers to be over- reliant 
on the work o f already existing neo- liberal and neo- conservative development institutions when 
engaging in debates around rural restructuring (1993: 33). While capital has moved quickly to pre­
empt many the rhetoric ofthe left - “empowerment”, “redistribution” “grassroots” etc - the left failed 
to ground its proposals for forms of agricultural production with a strong socialist orientation in the 
specifics o f the current South African conjuncture, thus remaining at the level o f making "the 
meaningless gestures o f a tired socialist rhetoric" (Vaughn 1990: 101-2).
The ANC's land redistribution policies also need to be understood against the background 
ofthe political changes that took place in South Africa since February 1990 ‘Transition theory” (see 
inter alia, Adam and Moodley 1993; Ginsberg n.d ), despite it many shortcomings, provides some 
useful insights into the nature o f South Africa’s democratisation.
According to  transition theory, a move towards democratisation takes place when the 
incumbent regime is imable to crush its opposition, but the opposition is itself unable to overthrow
the regime. Preferring accommodation to a war o f attrition, regime “softliners” and opposition 
“moderates” move towards a new order through a process o f compromises. The outcome is a 
"limited democracy", a parliamentary regime which is able to provide the conditions for the 
reproduction of the mode of production (such as infrastructure), but which cannot rule against 
entrenched interests such as the military, the State bureaucracy and, most importantly for our study, 
the capitalist class
The negotiations at Kempton Park in South Africa resulted in a number o f compromises that 
would impact on land reform possibilities. The Interim Constitution carried two clauses o f especial 
relevance to land redistribution. The first o f these was a guarantee o f private property rights, with 
the proviso that expropriation could occur only for "public purposes" (such as building schools). The 
second was a "restitution o f land rights clause" which only guaranteed the right to claim restoration 
of land seized under Apartheid (not a right to actual restoration), and which, moreover, specified 
that restitution would take place only if the State certified that it was "feasible" in a given case 
(Marais 1994). Negotiators argued that the inclusion o f a property clause was necessary to create 
a climate conducive to attracting foreign investment in the interest o f promoting development.
Sacrificed in such compromises were the demands of the rural working class and poor for 
land redistribution. However, transition theory errs by suggesting that the opposition is forced by 
the nature of the transition itself to adopt a moderate stance. This tends to overstate opposition 
radicalism. In addition, transition theory suggests that the main constraint on the outcome of the 
negotiations is the “stalemate” between regime and opposition. This tends to suggest that social 
power is centred on opposing political forces -  the dictatorship and the democrats- rather than 
examining the full range of sources o f inequality in society. Class power is the key variable in this 
regard
The ANC was, in addition, not simply forced into negotiations. It had always declared its 
willingness to enter negotiations with the South African government, provided this dealt with the 
removal o f political inequality- "White minority rule" (Lodge 1989) Regarding the economy, the 
ANC repeatedly denied charges o f “communism”, insisting that, in O.R Tambo’s 1985 words, 
(Callinicos 1988: 134):
The Freedom Charter does not even purport to want to destroy the capitalist system. All that 
the Freedom Charter does is to envisage a mixed economy in which part o f the economy, 
some of the industries, would be controlled, owned by the state (as happens in many 
countries), and the rest by private ownership- a mixed economy.
This ideological moderation clearly facilitated (although does not entirely explain) the ANC's 
acceptance of neo- liberal policy prescriptions and private property rights.
Beyond this, the ANC consistently presented itself as a truly "national" political formation 
in the sense that it sought to represent a broad and often divergent set o f class and other interest 
groups. Thus, all ANC documents -  including the RDP -  have necessarily accommodated the
aspirations o f a broad range o f social actors, including aspirant Black capitalists. In other words, the 
social composition of the ANC provided an additional impetus for a pro- market "resolution" of the 
land question. A multi-class coalition cannot be built except on the basis of recognition of the class 
interests of the bour geoisie- and thus, o f a capitalist solution And the roots o f the ANC itself in 
19 12 lay precisely amidst the African bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie frustrated by white minority 
rule
Overall, then, we have argued that the adoption o f an essentially moderate land reform policy 
by the ANC, then the leading oppositional force, and now the majority party in parliament, is directly 
related to a variety o f both objective and subjective factors. On the one hand, the circumstances of 
the transition made it imperative that concessions be made to powerful vested interests like 
organised White agriculture On the other, the ANC proved itself unable to mount an ideological 
challenge to neo- liberal policies, both due to the paralysis o f much o f the left, and due to the 
prevalence of socially moderate ideological strands and class forces at the core o f the movement.
RURAL SOCIETY:
No account o f the balance o f class forces can be complete without a consideration of the role 
played by the exploited classes. The absence o f a coherent and organised land- based social 
movement in representing the needs o f  rural people is one of the main reasons why their voices and 
concerns were consistently marginalised in the processes o f land policy formulation.
Despite the central role which land dispossession and forced removals have played in the 
development o f apartheid and colonialism in South Africa, land has never featured very highly on 
the ANC's agenda, being largely relegated to the background o f strategic agendas and thinking 
(Levin and Solomon 1994: 259). The ANC’s focus was also historically on urban mass struggles and 
trade unionism (see Bundy 1984; Levin and Solomon 1994: 259-60). Similarly, the sustained mass- 
based struggles o f the 1980s (led largely by elements aligned to the ANC) were largely confined to 
the urban areas; neither the unions nor the United Democratic Front were able to organise large- 
scale rural resistance. Even where resistance did take place in the rural areas in the 1980s, it tended 
to be centred around educational and civic issues, rather than on land This historic focus on urban 
and working- class struggles partly reflects South Africa's high level o f industrialisation and 
urbanisation (ibid ). Unlike organised urban constituencies who could embark on industrial action 
and protests in big towns, the rural people were dispersed across different farms; there were few big 
centres in which they could congregate on a noticeable scale.
An embryonic rural movement did begin to develop in the 1990s, and was spearheaded by 
the National Land Committee (NLC). The NLC initiated a "Back to the Land" campaign in 1993, 
which organised a number o f actions including a march on the World Trade Centre to protest the 
inclusion o f the property clause in the Interim Constitution. As noted above, the NLC also convened 
a Community Land Conference in early 1994. In March 1996, rural people protested the inclusion 
of the property clause in the final constitution (to no avail) in March 1996.
Despite the actions o f 1993-6, the voice of the mral working class and poor found few 
listeners Rural opposition was ignored at the 1993 LPC conference, and the Community Land 
Conference of 1994 took place after the publication of the RDP Base Document. Although unions, 
civics and education sector organisations were involved in the preparation of the RDP Base 
Document (its genealogy is covered in Gotz n.d.), a land based rural social movement was not.
Perhaps the only exception to this general process o f marginalisation has been the labour 
tenants who are relatively strongly organised and thus capable o f putting their demands to the 
government (for background see Ditlhake, 1994:134). The labour tenants threatened to create 
political instability and "war with the fanners" if evictions from the farms continued, and if the 
government failed to  provide legislation which would protect them. Though concentrated in 
Mpumalanga and Kwazulu-Natal provinces, labour tenants were sufficiently organised to 
successfully pressurise the government to pass the Land Reform (Labour T enant) Act in March 1996 
which grants security o f tenure.
Significantly, the Act was passed despite the fierce protests o f large- scale White commercial 
fanners organised in the South Afiican Agricultural Union (SAAU). The SAAU is a well- resourced 
and powerful interest groups: an extremely powerful section of capital in the apartheid period, 
agribusiness’s submissions concerning the need for a free land market and the protection o f  private 
property have also been consistently adhered to in the new government's land reform policies. 
Overall, SAAU remains the dominant interest group in the agricultural sector, and one whose 
ideological position conforms to the neo- liberal model. The new law regarding labour tenancy might 
thus be seen as a compromise: on the one hand, it meets some o f the demands o f the labour tenants, 
on the other, it confines to addressing issued o f security o f tenure rather than the central questions 
of land ownership and distribution.
One final rural interest group needs to be mentioned are the traditional authorities 
represented by the Congress o f  Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). Having been 
formed in 1987, "Contralesa has over 3000 paid up members" (Land Update, September 1993: 10), 
but does not enjoy popular grassroot base support (CPLAR, 1994:232-233). Contralesa called for 
a strengthening o f the chieftaincy in the allocation of redistributed land. Contralesa's demands were 
rejected by the ordinary rural populace who viewed them as undemocratic: in particular, the South 
African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) played a central role in voicing this opposition to 
chiefly control of the land, although it did not raise broader issues o f land redistribution. The chiefs, 
who aligned themselves to the ANC through Contralesa, would play a very important role m shaping 
the actual implementation of land reform policies, as will be shown below.
a
MEDIA AND ITS ROLE:
The role o f the media, though often understated in policy formulation, is an important one. 
Walt (1994) has argued that both the print and electronic media tends to propagate views that 
uphold the status quo. This argument is consistent with the South Afncan experience in which the 
media, largely controlled by monopoly capital and the State, has generally acted to defend white 
capitalist interests. For example, the South Afncan Broadcasting (SABC) has been repeatedly 
accused of bias. During the process o f negotiations in the 1990s, for example, despite unbanning of 
the national liberation movements, the SABC consistently presented the National Party (NP) as the 
founder o f the new South Afnca, whilst left- wing parties got no more than a lip- service (Louw 
1992. 12). In addition, the media exhibits a marked urban bias in its coverage o f issues.
However, it cannot be denied that the media did give prominent coverage to the struggle of 
the labour tenants. Similarly, the demands o f the communities who attended the historic Community 
Land Conference were accorded wide publicity. Non-governmental organisations like the National 
land committee were also interviewed during this period. Through news agencies like that of 
Reuters, the conference's demands were able to receive widespread coverage, including air- time on 
CNN international and space in a Pakistani newspaper. The attention attracted by the Community 
Land Conference may have been partly due to the initiatives of the National Land Committee which 
produced items ranging from T- shirts to caps, press packages to business cards, newspaper 
advertisements and post cards to heighten public awareness o f land issues (NLC: 1994-1995).
THE LAND REFORM IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: DISTURBING REALITIES
In addition to explicit policy guidelines, the outcome of a given policy is also strongly 
conditioned by the process o f its implementation. Policy formulation not only "... involves the 
decision to act on some particular problems, but includes subsequent decisions relating to its 
implementation..." (Walt, 1994:41). As du Toit points out (1994),
No matter how a good policy is, it has to be implemented by social actors who will themselves be part 
of social reality in all its recalcittant and intractable density, its inenia and complexity. Policy makers 
will find themselves being second-guessed, third- and fourth- guessed. Their plans, for from resolving 
the antagonistic contexts that constitute social reality, will themselves become snarled up in those 
contexts. Subsequently the resulting programmes tend to be bogged down in bureaucratic webs and 
obstractive technicism, since there is no real constituency lobbying to see them through- the landless 
don't own such policy; the experts who drew up the policy have retreated to their suburtian homes 
in Joharmesburg, Pretoria, Washington, London.
Experience with land reform elsewhere in Africa has shown that efforts to redistribute rural 
land to “the disadvantaged” or to the “rural landless” have tended to  reinforce existing forms, and 
given rise to new dimensions o f inequality within beneficiary communities (Hall 1998: 450). It is our 
contention that, in the South African case, even the highly flawed programme outlined by 
government land reform policy proposals has failed to materialise in the form envisaged by its 
planners. There has been a systematic failure at the level o f policy implementation to carry through 
the core recommendations o f official land reform policy. As will be discussed below, this may 
attributed to both State capacity constraints (itself related to the fiscal austerity o f GEAR), and the 
role played by local elite groups, who have sought to harness the land reform programme to their 
agendas for accumulation.
In other words, the South African land reform policy has failed to address the land and 
agrarian question at the levels o f policy formulation and policy implementation. Even the limited 
reforms envisaged in official policy have failed to come to pass, with less than 3% o f land likely to 
be redistributed by the end of 1999, as opposed to the 30% envisaged in the policy (Sihlongonyane 
1997).
The formulators o f the land reform policy paid relatively little attention to the question of 
implementation. Although several institutional structures were established by the land reform policy, 
the assumption underlying the projections for land redistribution was that o f perfect implementation 
by a benevolent State. Yet, as noted earlier, the policy process itself is shaped by powerful political, 
ideological and class dynamics, a practise in power relations, a contest o f  rights often set under the 
aegis of “development”. Conventional development practises often visualise models around 
policymaking process in a way that tends to disengage the formulation process from the 
implementation process. Once devised, a policy is seen as a largely technical process to be 
implemented by administrative agencies at the national or sub-national levels. Attempts are rarely 
taken at the policy making level to close the gap between formulation of policy and implementation. 
The bureaucratic, financial, managerial and technical aspects o f the policy are rarely taken into 
cognisance (Walt 1994).
This model o f “perfect implementation”, then, as Hogwood and Gurm (1984) argue, is 
premised on the assumed existence of ten pre-conditions. Yet, whilst these preconditions provide 
a useful checklist, few policy document hardly achieve them. The following is a brief summary of 
the imperatives o f a “perfect implementation”:
1. Policy is based on a valid theory of cause and effect If policies are bad policies, they can 
fail. Every policy is based on a theory (although it may not be explicit) o f cause and effect, 
and if this is wrong, the policy will be unsuccessful.
2. Successful policy implementation requires that circumstances external to the agent do not 
impose crippling constraints.
3. Adequate time and sufficient resources must be available A lack o f resources.
whether they are of personnel, equipment or finances, affects implementation.
4 The required combination of resources is available.
5. The relationship between cause and effect must be direct, with few, if any, 
intervening links. Any implementation process is a long one, and involves a complex series 
o f  events and linkages, any o f which may derail policy.
6. Dependency relationships are minimal. The existence of many participants may 
derail the implementation process as a whole.
There is an understanding o f and agreement on, objectives. However sometimes
the policy objectives are often quite vague and different actors may have different
conceptions o f what constitutes implementation.
10.
Tasks are fully specified in correct sequence. If policies are to be executed 
uniformly, ail tasks to be carried out by different organisations or people have to be clearly 
differentiated. Many at times policy failures occurs due to confusion or duplication.
Conununication and co-ordination must be perfect. However, the breakdown in 
communication and the difficulties o f co-ordination are often seen as legion, it is often 
difficult to see how this would ever be achieved, although it might be aspired to.
Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance. Except for those 
military governments that have used coercion to enforce policies, it is difficult to see how 
any authority will be able to attain complete compliance where impiementers or target 
groups are radically opposed.
Few o f  these conditions obtained in the case of South African land reform policy 
implementation. The fact that the current land reform policy was a product o f a negotiated 
settlement renders itself a “mild” policy geared towards balancing competing rights to land, as 
evidenced in its reliance on the market mechanism for redistribution, despite the skewed power 
relations that exist in the South African land market. With regards to constraints on policy 
implementation, existing conflicts between traditional authorities and rural councils have halted land 
reform projects. Limited budgetary allocations -reflecting the fiscal constraints imposed by GEAR- 
for land reform have constrained the leverage the government could exercise in executing its 
functions within the land reform process. The lack o f a viable combination of financial and human 
resources, and o f  political will, has undermined the ability o f the Department o f Land Affairs to 
implement its programmes. Finally, post-transfer tasks have not been clearly spelt out.
It is more useful, then, to see policy implementation in terms o f what has been termed the
“bottom-up” view of policy implementation, which acknowledges that implementers often play an 
important and active part in policy implementation. Even within the State itself, the relationship 
between different layers and components o f the government administrative structure is contested. 
The power o f the centre, resting heavily on funding structures and bureaucratic chains of command, 
cannot be assumed to be absolute (Mills et al. 1990, Walt 1994: 159). Indeed, the very failure of 
planners to take adequate cognisance of the complexities o f implementation lays the basis for 
additional actors to impact on the policy. The involvement o f both the implementers and other 
actors in the policy implementation process may lead to a de fa cto  redefinition o f  implementation 
programmes and even the redefinition of objectives o f the policy itself Hence, Walt (1994) states;
If there are clusters of public and private actors involved in formulating and influencing the outcome 
of policy, then there are other, or the same, clusters involved in implementation. Some may be the 
supposed beneficiaries of the policy . . policy formulation and implementation are two elements in 
a contmuous loop, and both as political as the other.
A CASE STUDY: LAND REFORM IN MPUMALANGA PROVINCE.
Institutiontd Challenges Facing the Province’s Land Reform Programme:
These points -and, consequently, an analysis o f  the failure o f the South Afncan land reform 
policy at the level o f implementation- may be illustrated by a case study o f Mpumalanga province.
Of the nine provinces in South Alnca, Mpumalanga has experienced some o f the greatest 
difficulties in amalgamating previous homeland administrations into a single provincial 
administration. Interviews conducted so far, revealed that provincial departments concerned with 
land reform implementation offered very little that was o f practical use to land delivery- irrespective 
of the commitment some government officials showed. One o f the problems which all the senior 
personnel faced was that o f inadequate capacity not only within the departments but also equally 
within the communities with which they worked' Their constant plea to non-govemmental 
organisations to complement their efforts -  an attempt to fill the capacity gap within the departments 
and the targeted client communities - was a clear indication of the problems faced (also, o f  the 
openings for a range o f actors to be involved in policy implementation).
Capacity problems were worse within the local government bodies such as local councils 
which undermined plans to decentralise the implementation of land reform projects to the local level 
Limited capacity problems within the departments have undermined inter-departmental co-operation 
(i e horizontal integration). Some institutional structures (as will be seen later) have tended to 
marshal more powers than others, assuming an independent role within the implementatton process, 
thus undermining the co-ordination necessary to the land reform process. A "them and us" attitude 
between departments, and independent role creation, has hindered attempts to make implementation 
process an integrated process involving the different stakeholders within the government 
departments. This has meant that there has been the development of a marked disjuncture between
the national land reform policy with regards to implementation at the national, provincial and local 
levels. This has made it difficult for land reform policies to respond to grassroots realities and 
challenges.
Mpumalanga, however, has very few non-govemmental organisations and community-based 
organisations that actively participate in land reform in the province. Non-govemmental 
organisations focussed on land issues are typically based in Gauteng, and all are under financial 
pressure due to declining donor funding. Some such as the Farm Workers Resource Research 
Project have, indeed, collapsed for this reason. The experience, community facilitation expertise and 
capacity-building skills that such structures could bring to bear has thus been absent, meaning that 
these organisations have been unable to strengthen the weak institutional hand of the State.
Overall, the implementation o f the land reform policy remains centralised in nature. Even if 
we assume away the existence of serious local capacity problems, it is clear that this centralisation 
helps stifles the provincial and local government initiatives. The Department o f Land Affairs national 
office exercise great powers in terms o f resource allocation, allowing it to dictate to lower level 
stmctures its policy tenets. This worsened administrative problems by polarising the “core” (national 
office) with the “periphery” (provincial and local structures) in terms of power and responsibilities 
allocated to them. From the responses o f interviewees it became clear that land reform process 
was managed as a top-down process o f policy implementation, notwithstanding commitments to 
allow local government structures to play a central role in implementation. Proposals to expand the 
current, limited, bureaucracy that exists at the lower level structures (such as the district offices)^ 
notwithstanding, very few resources have been leveraged from other agencies of government, thus 
creating serious consequences for the post-transfer sustainability or income generating activities of 
land reform communities. There have been few attempts, for example, to ensure that local 
government is ultimately responsible for the operation and maintenance o f key infrastructure or 
could cope with the new additional tasks for which they are now to be responsible
The expected roles the (national) Department o f Land Affairs and the (provincial) 
Department o f Land Affairs bear further examination. The specified role of the provincial level o f 
the Department is to actually transfer land from the owner to the target community. It releases funds 
needed for the purchase of the identified land by the community. After the transfer is complete, the 
provincial administration system is meant to move in and assists with the development o f the land. 
However, although the development and planning o f land use is the sole responsibility o f the 
provincial administrative systems, they have been unable to assume this role due to institutional 
weakness and lack of a clear role definition for each respective institution. Interviews indicated that 
the provincial level o f the Department o f Land Affairs has operated only in line with the policies of 
the Department o f Land Affairs headquarters in Pretoria.^
These centralised institutional problems are, however, rooted in the national constitution. 
The Constitution o f the Republic o f South Africa as adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 
October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly, outlines the various legislative competencies of 
national and provincial government in Schedule 4. Schedule 4 of the constitution contains a list of 
functional areas o f concurrent national and provincial legislative competence This list includes 
legislative competencies such as agriculture, environment, housing, public works, regional planning
and development, soil conservation and urban and rural development These are functional areas 
which are relevant and applicable to post-transfer redistribution projects (Williams 1998).
Formally, then, the provincial government has the right to operate in these areas. In 
practice, it lacks the ability to do so. The provincial government has not - and arguably, due to 
financial constraints, could not - employ sufficiently committed staff, or provide capital budgets and 
other support mechanisms to execute and administer these functional areas as they relate to  land 
reform projects The result o f this situation has been an abdication to a large degree o f the provincial 
government's role in the land reform process to date (Williams, 1998). Arguably, it is precisely this 
lack of capacity that underpins the centralisation o f policy implementation described above In 
addition, provincial legislation related to the land reform process remains underdeveloped
The miscoordination between the different levels o f the Department o f Land Affairs has 
been recognised as a serious problem by the government. The Mid-term Review of the Land Reform 
Pilot Programme stated that:
the primary challenge now is to promote the integration of land reform planning and priorities with
emerging processes of integrated development plarming at provincial and local governance levels.... Key
concerns must be the interaction between DLA (at national and provincial levels). ..and work to build 
institutions and capacity for land administration and development planning at local government level 
(Department of Land Affairs, 1997:23).
The lack of finance leads to problematic results in the land reform process. For one, it leads 
to a limited rate o f land transfer. Secondly, attempts to overcome funding constraints have led to 
further complications. Where land has been overvalued above the market value, the provincial 
Department o f Land Affairs finds it difficult to buy the designated land for the community This in 
turn encourages the Department to increase the size of the community beneficiaries in order to 
command more resources for the project in question. The direct result o f amalgamating target 
beneficiaries into a "community" o f people is that it raises serious questions of group dynamics. This 
in turn threatens the survival and sustainability o f the project in question. A process of negotiation 
then has to come to play which at times proved difficult and time consuming.
The Department o f Land Affairs has to ensure that state resources are wisely used and that 
prices negotiated are just and equitable and correspond to the guidelines stipulated under the land 
reform process. The valuations done by the Land Bank were identified as been unfairly high by the 
Department o f Land Affairs.’ Among community members,
the process of evaluating and negotiating the land purchases is a paiticulatfy emotive one and dangerous 
issue There is a perception that local farmers are trying to get inflated prices for land that they are anxious 
to sell because they fear the impact of land claims and redistribution on the market value (AFRA NEWS, 
1994)
Even where land has been transferred, inadequate institutional support has been provided 
to projects in the post-transfer stage Comparative evidence suggests that such support is vital to 
the success o f a land reform project. Taking into account the vast expanse of the districts in
Mpumalanga understaffed offices - such as the Ermelo district office that currently has two staff 
only- the long-term feasibility o f land reforms must inevitably be cast into question. In Zimbabwe 
for example, it was found that the district councils covered very large areas, and the situation 
pertaining to land at a more localised level remained confused even affer land became the 
responsibility o f elected district councils. Land therefore became a tussle between local party leaders 
and traditional leaders. In Namibia, the District authorities neither had the staff, the local knowledge 
or the legal mandate to deal with land disputes and land allotment, nor to monitor land use (LAPC 
1997)
Local government involvement in post- transfer projects has, to date, been minimal in 
Mpumalanga. The provincial Department o f Land Affairs offices also offered limited assistance in 
the development o f an institutional support structure which would strengthen the capacity of 
provincial and local government structures to push forth land development objectives in the post 
transfer stage. Yet the multi-faceted nature of post transfer redistribution projects requires that a 
wide variety o f role players be networked and participate in the post-transfer planning and 
- ' implementation stage. The effect then, is that provincial offices such as the one in Nelspruit at best 
are effectively only able to effect a land transfer back to the beneficiary communities. No real 
subsequent support is offered^.
This further worsens the problem o f capacity at the community level. Target communities 
are often unable to push forth the post-transfer stage of the land reform process. This incapacity is 
also evident at the community leadership level. Community leaders often demonstrate a limited 
understanding o f the processes and tasks that lie ahead in the post-transfer phase. One of the reasons 
for this is that only a few projects that are currently in the post-transfer phase had planning agents 
that were appointed prior to designation. Poor planning in the pre-planning phase of a project has 
caused enormous delays in the delivery o f benefits to communities and has often caused serious 
damage to the viability o f the redistribution projects.
Community conflict often emerges, where post-transfer support is not given and the "go 
it alone" approach has led to failure to deliver to the expectations created in the pre-transfer phase. 
Undemocratic decision making, gate keeping and a lack of transparency are often nothing less than 
the symptoms o f a community or their leadership not understanding the rights and duties regulated 
by their constitutions and/or the legislation governing the formation and functioning of legal entities 
(Williams 1998)
These conflicts are also indicative o f the way that the land reform policy implicitly 
conceptualises the concept o f a "community" Structured into these policies is the assumption that 
a community is a homogenous entity unified by one common identity and characteristics or needs. 
In practice, this has not been the case. Kepe (1998) tor instance defines a community in sociological 
terms with a focus on spatial units, i e. people that share a common locality, and points out that there 
are often conflicting ideas o f who belongs to which group He also defines a community as an 
economic unit, where different groups share common interests, control particular resources or share 
similar economic activities to make a living He further argues that the concept o f "community" 
within South Africa’s Land Reform has both positive and negative connotations. It is positive when 
it helps to focus policies on the needs o f the specified community. It is negative when it forces
conflicting groups together and mutes the voice of the weaker group. It is this latter feature of the 
concept o f community that poses the greatest threat to the implementation of the land reform 
programme.
In rural South Africa, the genesis o f this problem lies in the historical legacy o f the apartheid 
system Most rural communities in South Africa were essentially "invented" through social 
engineering. This was effected through coercing people together from different locations who held 
different beliefs and customs through the Group Areas Act and other related apartheid policies. The 
notion of a community hence, seems problematic in this case. Organising groups of people into 
"communities" creates intricate political and social undercurrents that ultimately slow down the 
process o f the redistribution project. The lack of homogenous communities is brought to the fore 
by the problem of conflict within communities. The high price o f land does not permit the individual 
members o f the rural poor to acquire a reasonable area o f land. The government grant o f R 15,000 
(increased to 16 000 rand) is hardly enough to purchase even a hectare o f land. The solution to this 
is the pooling of resources by communities to enable them to acquire and manage a reasonable area 
of land. There are however group dynamics and consequences thereof There is always the problem 
of differing needs and expectations within every community. Land may be needed for agricultural 
production or housing. Even within agricultural production, they are several options available to 
individuals within a community. It is therefore always difficult to come up with one option or make 
a decision that suits all needs This process takes time hence causing delays during the 
implementation stage of the project. Even when a decision is made about the intended uses o f the 
land, not every member's needs are to be addressed.
Community conflict is further illustrated by the question o f the chieftaincy. Land reform 
elsewhere in Africa^ has often accommodated itself to existing agrarian power structures rather than 
realign the power relations that surround land ownership as a reservoir o f power in a given society. 
Beneficiary selection processes in Mpumalanga have so far rarely been a transparent, democratic and 
an accountable process in some o f the projects undertaken. This problem is exacerbated by the 
reinstatement o f the chieftaincy. Community participation processes also become difficult to achieve 
given the kind of hegemony the chiefs are creating for themselves. Due to the heterogeneity o f rural 
people, mechanisms for facilitating land access and rural development in general, would have to take 
cognisance o f the diversity o f needs rural people have, as opposed to idealising a mythical 
"community". This can only be achieved through developing democratic participatory processes at 
the grassroots level These set o f dynamics are succinctly captured through the Emjidini 
redistribution project which has been beleaguered by a set o f institutional conflicts through its 
implementation process. The following summarised version of the Emjidini redistribution project 
attest to this observation:
Background:
This project involves the acquisition o f the Remainder o f the farm Sassenheim 695 JT and 
Portion 3 o f the farm Sassenheim 695 JT owned by Mr. A.B. Pohl and Mr. Malan respectively. The 
project started in 1993 and was/is facilitated by the Department o f Land Affairs, Mpumalanga 
Provincial Office. It is situated in the district of Barberton The Emjidini tribe is one o f the victims 
o f  forced removals. It was realized that there was a need to resettle members o f the Emjidini tribe 
who were scattered all around Barberton District and other adjacent areas.
The central needs o f the community were to obtain land for residential settlement and other 
community services, facilities and agricultural farming. The sum total of the resettlement areas is 
889,4 hectares. 401 hectares will be used for residential settlement and other community facilities. 
Residential sites o f 2 OOOm^  (40 m by 50 m) in size each will be demarcated and allocated to all 
family beneficiaries. Community facilities such as a community hall, schools, clinics, sports facilities, 
churches, and businesses will also be accommodated. The remaining 488,4 hectares constitute, 
according to the Department of Agriculture, a highly potential land and will be used strictly for 
farming and grazing. The Emjidini Trust holds land on behalf o f the 586 family beneficiaries on the 
basis o f communal ownership(DLA 1998).
The Emjindini community initially wanted to opt for the restitution pillar o f land reform but 
due to the logistics (institutional and legal) involved, the community was advised by the Department 
o f  Land Affairs that restitution was going to be a lengthy and time- consuming procedure before land 
is awarded to the claimants. Land redistribution was thought to be the fastest route the conununity 
should follow as compared to the lengthy judicial and bureaucratic hurdles experienced under the 
Restitution Act. They were therefore advised by the Provincial Department o f Land Affairs (PDLA) 
to opt for the redistribution project’.
Mr. Derrick Ndlovu, a councilor for Emjindini area was not satisfied with the way the 
Emjindini project was formulated. Participation of the local communities was minimal and he feared 
that community tension and conflict was bound to erupt should allotment o f the land parcels start 
thereafter."*
0 Inherent Political Dynamics at the Village level:
The project as previously argued was one, which was to be compatible with the RDP 
guidelines. For example, these called for transparency where all community members were meant 
to partake in the project. The government pre-planning documents (Provincial Department of Land 
Affairs 1997) portrayed the project as one which was a product o f a wider consultative process that 
had been reached between the different stakeholders. However this view was strongly contested by 
different stakeholders. The current contestation, which has hampered infrastructural development, 
is not amplified at the provincial levels.
Key informant interviews conducted with some o f the ANC councilors, indunas and 
members of the community who have moved onto the new land however reveal that nothing has 
actually changed in terms of economic empowerment o f the beneficiaries". Indeed, the project as 
a whole has raised quite a number of pertinent problems, which have threatened community 
cohesiveness at the grassroots
One of the key ANC councillors (Derrick Ndlovu), who was at the forefront of championing 
the anomalies of this project, articulated certain inherent procedural and institutional obstacles that 
the project has come to face since its inception
For instance, according to Councillor Derrick Ndlovu, the Emjindini Trust has claimed that 
the trustees are community representatives and it is evident that the committee was operating like 
the tribal councils because according to them, they are claiming land on behalf o f the chief who 
seems not to enjoy popular grassroots support". The trust was however dissolved with the 
culmination of the CPA in 1997
Councillor Ndlovu foresees some conflict breaking out in the near future Community 
squabbles resonate around the arbitrary criteria employed to select the 586 targeted beneficiaries. 
For example little information about those nominated as beneficiaries exist. It seems there were no 
clear frameworks developed for the communities to become involved in the process.
Another glaring issue that makes this project questionable is how democratic the Emjindini 
T mst is. The question of who nominated this trust is mysterious Councillor Ndlovu, claims that the 
Chief nominated his beneficiaries in an ad hoc matmer. Arbitrary selection o f beneficiaries was done 
such that,
" even people walking across the road were called to fill in the forms"".
A social impact assessment was not conducted on this project. Communities have different 
needs with respect to land but these were not carefully investigated during the selection process 
Conflict over land use will most likely emerge given the fact that land designated (for resettlement) 
under the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act (Act 126 of 1993), is not liable to  land use 
controls as stipulated under the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (Act 70 o f 1970). The 
structure of this demand would have required a closer re-examination. Communities are also 
differentiated on basis of income and it seems that the arbitrary selection criteria used in this project 
were unable to identify the poorest community members who have become conventional losers in 
development projects.
Given these loopholes, losers in this project are bound to view the Emjindini project as an 
exclusive and a biased project Management crises and changes have also not spared the project as 
a whole. From the project’s onset, 3 different PDLA staff have been involved for different durations 
before being moved into other projects. Ms. Mosupye initially pioneered the Emjidini project before 
assuming the directorship o f the lowveld escarpment region. Mr. Mongwe later moved in to take 
charge of the project before being moved into the tenure reform directorate. Currently the project 
is now under Chris Williams who now blames most o f the project anomalies on his predecessors His 
greatest bone of discontent is that the project lacked a well-written business plan".
On the other hand, tension between the rural local government and the chieftaincy seemed 
already imminent. According to Derrick Ndlovu,’’ the chieftaincy does not co-operate with the 
elected rural councillors. They view them as "politicians" who are there to oppose them on 
"development" issues. However, this study infers that the rural councillors are wary about losing 
their political support and power base should land reform be controlled by the chieftaincy. To the 
chief, the land reform process is a platform through which he is able to re-invent himself and gain 
his allegiance from his subjects.
On a point o f concern, these opposing, and contesting political views and dynamics need to 
be factored within the current policy framework if land reform delivery is to continue as desired. 
Land reform seems to be functional to the proliferation o f  power by local community bodies 
purporting to be democratic bodies representing the needs of the community as it simultaneously 
becomes dysfunctional to the proliferation of democracy at the village level.
However a year later, after the initial interview on the project (in 1997), it appears that very 
little has indeed been achieved in this project. The only radical change that has occurred was the 
dissolution o f the Emjidini Trust and the subsequent formation o f a CPA. The tension between these 
two institutions still seemed considerable. The ANC councillors are against people moving from the 
townships to the designated land and because of this they are viewed as "enemies o f development" 
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Irrespective o f this contestation, members of the Emjidini community have started to move 
into the designated areas long before plans to invest into the infrastructural development have been 
made. This is on condition they pay him some fee (250 rand) which is purportedly meant to assist 
in infrastructural development which to date has never been actualised. According to the chiefs the 
250 rand is viewed as a Konza fee which is payable to the chief from his subjects. He claims this is 
a long held traditional practice, to which the chief is entitled, from his subjects. According to the 
chief, this money is geared towards developing basic infrastructure for the communities, a process 
which has never happened. This furthers re-alfirms long- held fears that the existing land reform 
policy is not directly linked to the whole question of agrarian transformation. Limited empowerment 
change is notable among this target community. The most conspicuous change so far is the 
emergence o f factional groups that represent the two warring parties (rural councillors and the 
chief)
The chief on the other hand has been attempting to intensify his search for political hegemony 
at the grassroots. His militancy was evident when challenged by the PDLA about the alleged fees
Ohe charged. The chief was requested to stop collecting the money but this never ended even after the PDLA warned him to stop in a strongly worded letter that read.
"This Department is aware of the position of the Tmst and has advised them that they are entitled 
to institute legal action to prevent the Tribal Authority allocating stands on their property. As the 
Emjidini Trust are accountable to the law and to uphold all legal provisions pertauiuig to their 
property, the Department has advised the Emjidini Trust that they should use whatever legal steps 
necessary to protect the rights and interests of the baieficiary community. The Department therefore 
advises you not to persist with the allocation of stands and not to obstruct the plannmg process 
which is underway on the Tmsts property" (PDLA, 1999).
According to Ndlovxi'*, as a result of the chiefs performance, a/the majority o f the community 
members are against the chief The only people who support the chief come from outlying areas and 
are in search of some land to occupy. The Emjidini committee, which had initially been appointed 
by the chief, was dissolved in June 1998, and a trust was formed instead. Given this wave o f attack 
on the chief from the government, the chief decided to institute restitution claims on the same land. 
This portrayed his limited and ill-conceived understanding o f the land reform process as a whole. 
This is because land bought through the redistribution programme is not subject to any restitution 
claims. Prior to buying the land, thorough research is done to ensure the land is not subject to any 
claims. However, the chiefs reading of the entire process is that the rural councils and the provincial 
Department of Land Affairs have no "respect fo r  him as a chief"''and neither do they understand 
the traditions that define the chiefs social relations with his subjects
Views from the community members who have settled in this new area were also expressive 
of their discontent and powerlessness. Majority o f the community members claimed they were 
unsatisfied with the current antagonism between the local government and the traditional authorities. 
Among them were some of the indunas who had started erecting temporary structures within the 
designated land. They claim that the government should indeed provide these facilities but as yet this 
has not been done. In fact, some indunas were not aware of the redistribution forms that other 
people had filled in. According to them, land access was made possible through the chiefs office. 
They were also cognisant o f the political tension that existed between the chief and the ANC 
councillors but felt quite helpless in the midst o f all these squabbles.
Most o f the women who had moved were victims of retrenchments by the surrounding forestry 
company, SAPPIE. Confusion of issues around the land question from the Community members 
have been confused by issues around the land question. This has been a great handicap and has 
come to aggravate the situation. In turn, this has accorded a political opportunity for the chief to 
consolidate his hegemonic powers over his subjects.”  To the ANC councillors, the land question 
is a political platform "to step onto" in quest o f a wider political base from their constituents. The 
exact roles o f these institutions have not yet been specified within the realm of land reform.
The community members who have moved to Emjidini land are compelled to live without any 
sewage facilities, water facilities, roads, or health facilities. They face a life o f destitution which puts 
into question the notion that land reform process may equally institutionalise “poverty traps” among 
its ciient communities.
A similar predicament was suffered by the Riemvasmaak Presidential Lead Project which was 
a restitution project in the Northern Cape. Due to slow and ad hoc planning processes, the 
Riemvasmaak residents became impatient. Frustrated by delays, they decided to build solid structures 
irrespective o f the post -transfer infrastructural plans set by the planners. Rapid re-settlement- with 
little post-settlement support, an inexperienced trust trying to build a new community, and people 
living in temporary shacks became a sure recipe for conflict in this community (LAPC, 1995:13-14).
The post-reform era has therefore basically been an era in which poverty traps have essentially 
been institutionalized and hopes of changing the livelihood strategies o f this communities become 
a distant chimera immediately community members move into the designated lands. This current 
state o f affairs is however compounded by looming fears among some community members that they
are not prepared to  have the area developed into a township development for fear o f incurring rate 
payments. According to the chief he would rather see his subjects live in a rural environment but 
atleast have basic access to water. These fears were reiterated by some of the members who had 
moved in these areas. This was mainly because of their unemployed status Most of the people in 
this area were either victims of retrenchments by surrounding forestry companies such as Mondi. 
Others relocated from the locations in an attempt to come and farm in Emjidini.^'
In response to the chiefs actions, the Director in charge o f the Settlement Support 
programme, Chris Williams, has threatened to institute civic action against him. However his bone 
o f contention with the entire project is that irrespective of the theoretical recognition accorded to 
planning processes as envisaged within the redistribution policy, the Emjidini project seemed to 
emerge from a planning process which in many cases was ad hoc and never followed at ail. He 
blames the current stalemate on his earlier predecessor, Mr. Mongwe, who failed to enact the correct 
planning processes. This project is only among 30 other projects that Mr. Chris Williams is handling.
OThis to him is an arduous task especially given some o f the challenges he has to grapple with in some o f these projects. Under staffing and change o f project supervisors, eg ., from Miss Junior Mosupye 
who was initially in charge of the project to Mr. Mongwe and now to Williams who is in charge of 
the post-transfer phase simply superimposes logistical problems over time. Chris Williams has also 
had problems with the provincial House o f Traditional Leaders whose members he claims have 
tended to support the chiefs action.^
However, this current contest between the chief and the PDLA is anchored on some of the 
historical roots evident from past and present legislation which define the powers and roles local 
government and the chieftaincy institutions should command within their areas of jurisdiction. The 
key problem is that their constitutional role is provided for as if there were no statutes defining their 
role in the past. For example, section 229 o f the constitution, provides that:
“All laws which immediately before the commencement of this constitution were in force in any 
area which forms part of the national territory shall continue to be in force in that area, subject to 
any repeal or amendment by a competent authority” (Lazaras 1996).
To date some of this statutes have not been repealed. The implication therefore is that ail statutes 
that were dealing with the role o f traditional leaders are still in force with the exception of those, 
which have been repealed or amended by a competent authority. The constitution and statutes
_ passed in terms of the provisions of the constitution gave provincial and local governments
administrative and developmental powers in the same area of jurisdiction over which the traditional 
authorities/leaders also have jurisdiction. In terms o f the constitution, traditional leaders are ex- 
officio members of the local government structures. The problem however is that, the constitution 
does not define their role hence it becomes unclear what powers the traditional authorities have in 
relation to  local government. This has caused great confusion and over lap of role and power 
designation between the tribal authorities and the local government
This revised but illustrative case study succinctly captures the forms of institutional quagmire and
contradictions which the current land reform policy has to percolate through. This signifies the 
political character of a land reform process which cannot be ignored if one was to unearth the truth 
about the “normative limitations” that have come to be associated with a land reform programme 
under the aegis o f “Development” In any case one may need to ask: development (in form o f  land 
reform) from whom and to whom and why?
CONCLl'SION:
In this paper we have demonstrated how the land reform policies which have been articulated 
and, now, are beginning to be implemented by South Africa's post-apartheid capitalist State need to 
be understood as the product o f the interaction of a variety of contending forces operating at the 
international, national and local levels The outcome of policy-making does not necessarily reflect 
a harmonious resolution of the different claims o f the contending interest groups represented in the 
policy-making process, but rather signals the eventual triumph of dominant powerful groups over 
their opponents
Policy-making is not about “engagement” or “participation” in some sort of equal and open- 
ended process where positions are adopted because o f their intellectual appeal and coherence, or 
because of the policy-making “capacity” o f different actors. Rather, policies are adopted because o f 
the respective power o f the different social classes involved. Whilst the exploited classes may, when 
mobilised, force some compromises on the form o f policies adopted, the essence o f the policies will 
reflect the power of the ruling class. When the policy being contested centres around something as 
central as patterns o f ownership in the means of production -a s  in the case o f land policy, as 
opposed to, say, wage rates -  it is unrealistic to expect an equitable outcome under capitalism. Our 
research confirms this picture. A central theme in the land reform policy process has been the 
consistent marginalisation o f the concerns o f ordinary rural people - specifically, concerns over the 
1913 cut- off date for the restitution process, the leading role o f the market in land redistribution, 
and also calls for the imposition of a land tax -  and the victory o f agribusiness and, to a lesser extent, 
emerging Afncan capitalist class forces such as rentier chiefs.
In addition, we have argued that the neo-liberal macro-economic orientation o f the 
government - which was foreshadowed by the RDP's land reform policy - has severe implications 
for land reform policy Not only does a market-centred approach inherently limit the possible extent 
o f land redistribution, but fiscal constraints undermine the ability o f the government to implement 
even this limited land reform programme in the first place.
In conclusion, it may be useful to reflect on the probable outcome of these policies. In 
1990, a conference was held in Zimbabwe at which South African activists and academics examined 
what lessons Zimbabwe’s first decade of independence holds for South Africa's future land reform 
process (New Nation September 1990). The conference concluded that in Zimbabwe, land had 
continued to remain in the hands of a minority o f large- scale commercial farmers, predominantly 
White but joined increasingly by an emerging Black bourgeoisie The masses o f the rural population 
had experienced little benefit from land reform policies that have been in operation since the early
1980s.
At Independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 5,000 White farmers owned 50 percent of the land, 
with the remainder allocated to peasant farmers under communal tenure in African reserves. By the 
start o f the 1990s less than 5 percent o f the 900,000 communal area rural households had been 
resettled on new land under government-financed projects after land had been purchased through 
the market in “willing-buyer-willing-seller” arrangements. Resettlement typically involved marginal 
lands -the bulk of land available on the market- and the exclusion of women from ownership 
(Cammack, Pool and Tordoff 1988, Knight 1990, Levin and Weiner 1993, Weiner 1989: 402) 
Meanwhile, the key beneficiaries o f land redistribution tended to be wealthy and politically influential 
African households, and the dramatic expansion o f peasant production in this period was largely 
confined to this group (ibid ).
Is South Afirca headed for the same fate? The answer, unfortunately, would seem to be 
"yes". The experiences o f South Africa's neighbours seem to have had little impact on the
0 formulation o f land redistribution policies. Instead, these polices have consistently based themselves on the principles o f market- led land redistribution and the entrenchment of private property rights. 
Insofar as the masses o f the rural population are simply unable to purchase sufficient land, land 
hunger is certain to persist.
Can anything alter the situation? We argued that policy-making is a process shaped by 
power relations. It follows that the emergence of strong self-reliant organisations representing the 
rural working class is essential for progressive change. Such organisations could contest government 
policy, challenge the power of new elite groups like the revivified chieftaincy, an press for greater 
institutional support for new farming communities.
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